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REVIEWS OF BOOKS.

Essays on Truth and Reality. By F. H. BRADLEY. Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1914.—pp. xvi, 480.

"The present volume consists mainly of articles that have appeared in *Mind*. I have added a paper first printed in the PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW, and there are also some essays which have not before been published" (Preface). Most of the essays already published have appeared within the last half dozen years, though one ("Consciousness and Experience") dates as far back as 1893. The essays are designated as chapters and, though the coherence is naturally not so close as one would expect in a volume prepared as a unit for publication, the designation does not seem amiss. The whole makes up a fairly well-unified volume upon the subject indicated by the title and discusses, in relation to opposing points of view, some of the most fundamental principles of Mr. Bradley's philosophy. Ideas and their relation to reality, the pragmatic concept of practice, judgment and the principle of coherence, God and the Absolute, and immortality, are the chief of the more general topics dealt with.

Critics have learned to approach a book by Mr. Bradley with some fear and trembling. It is not so much that the author's acknowledged ability and wide learning properly make one weigh one's thoughts before one takes issue with him. Mr. Bradley's books are difficult; they are difficult because his philosophy itself is difficult. One may well doubt whether any English metaphysician since Hume has constructed a system with greater subtlety than has gone to the making of Mr. Bradley's. Without a formidable terminology, without crabbedness of style, without a scholastic array of technicalities, without unusual abstractness of argument, Mr. Bradley's philosophy is nevertheless extraordinarily difficult to grasp and still more difficult to criticize. It is elusive, and the critic who thinks he has caught a point and answered it, frequently finds himself told that he has not understood. This is by all odds the most common reply of Mr. Bradley to his critics.

Elusiveness of this sort is inherent in the nature of the system. A subtlety less in degree than Mr. Bradley's is bound to flounder in a philosophy which balances so nicely the conflicting motives of absolutism and relativism. Nowhere has the author emphasized the latter

phase of his system more strongly than in the present volume. It is the key-note of his summary: "Everywhere on behalf of the real Absolute I have been warning the reader against that false absolutism which in philosophy is to me another name for error. And it is an error which results in a two-fold mistake. It takes some distinction within the whole and asserts it as being real by itself and unconditionally; and then from this misconceived ground it goes on to deny or to belittle other complementary aspects of the same whole. But, as against such absolutism, the very soul of the Absolute which I defend is its insistence and emphasis on an all-pervasive relativism. Everything is justified as being real in its own sphere and degree, but not so as to entitle it to invade other spheres, and, whether positively or negatively, to usurp other powers. . . . Justice in the name of the Whole to each aspect of the world according to its special place and proper rank—Reality everywhere through self-restriction in claim and in denial—this may be said to be the principle which unites these Essays" (pp. 470 f.).

The consequence of this universal receptivity is that it is extraordinarily difficult to bring any difference of view to an issue. Every point of view, every theory, even every judgment, is at once both true and false, and the decision depends upon a delicate estimate of the surplus of one over the other. Considered merely from a tactical point of view, such subtlety cuts two ways. On the one hand, it reduces the critic to despair, for he cannot come to grips with it anywhere. When Mr. Bradley denies that change is real, his critics absurdly suppose him to mean that change does not exist (p. 471), whereas for Mr. Bradley, as for everyone else, 'the world is throughout full of change.' In other words, to deny that change is real does not modify one's acceptance of the actuality of any change whatever. What 'Common Sense' calls a fact leaves Mr. Bradley unmoved, for Common Sense and metaphysics have nothing to do with one another (p. 444). Even what seems to be a plain contradiction may be held for practical purposes (pp. 123 f., 132 f., 445), since one has faith that 'somehow' the Absolute transcends and harmonizes the discrepancy. What, then, is the critic to do, if neither facts nor contradictions can get through the philosopher's armor? On the other hand, however, subtlety has to be paid for. Mr. Bradley's denials to the contrary notwithstanding, the whole project of a metaphysics conceived in this fashion has an air of unreality about it. Metaphysics is like nothing else in heaven or earth; it has no practical consequences, except perhaps to induce a sort of sceptical tolerance (p. 443 ff.), and its ideal

theoretical interest is wholly unlike the theoretical interest of science (cf. pp. 220, 258, 267). Nowhere except in metaphysics is abstraction as such an error; everywhere else the question is whether a given abstraction furthers analysis. Everywhere else mere inclusion, accomplished 'somehow,' we know not how, spells disorder rather than harmony. Everywhere else to qualify one view as real or true means to qualify some other view as unreal. Is it any wonder, then, that Mr. Bradley's philosophy has seemed to more than one critic a bewildering attempt to have one's cake and eat it? Such criticism may be only 'Common Sense,' or it may arise from what Professor Bosanquet has called 'a lack of philosophical imagination,' but not everyone finds it so easy as Mr. Bradley to characterize and set aside his indispensable 'real world' (Ch. XVI). If a personal bias were in place, one might express a doubt as to whether philosophy can live in an atmosphere so highly rarified.

The peculiarity of Mr. Bradley's philosophy lies in what may be called broadly his theory of judgment, understanding this to include its implications regarding the general nature of reality. The theory has two main aspects, the concept of immediate experience (reality) and the theory of judgment strictly (truth). Like modern idealists generally, Mr. Bradley starts with the problem of dualism before him; a theory of knowledge must before everything else get beyond the cleft between knowledge and reality which had broken Kant's philosophy in halves. Reality therefore must be a union of being and knowing, of object and subject. For Mr. Bradley the type of such a union is found in the immediate experience of feeling (Ch. VI),—'a single state of undivided awareness' (p. 173). In such immediate experience we have unity, for the state is felt as undivided, yet this unity is capable of containing an indefinite amount of difference. Feeling is a non-relational unity in difference. Such immediacy transcends the distinction of terms and relations by being at once infra-relational and supra-relational,—infra-relational in the sense that a disharmony in immediate experience may at any time awaken the mediating, relational activity of judgment; supra-relational in the sense that such mediation, when it is complete, rests in the restored harmony of immediacy. Judgment, or the relational consciousness, falls within immediate experience; it emerges from it and merges into it again when its work is done. Immediate experience, therefore, is the background upon which judgment and thinking take place. It is not merely a stage of experience which disappears in the relational consciousness. "It remains at the bottom throughout as fundamental" (p. 161). It is experience and hence is reality.

The process of judgment presents the unity of experience in a relational form. The 'that' and the 'what,' which in immediate experience are one, are broken apart in judgment. This involves abstraction and selection, processes by which the judgment transcends immediate experience, for by them the implicit distinctions of the original unity in difference are made clear and definite. As terms and relations they are fixed in conceptual form, and the function of such mediation is the production of a higher type of unity in difference which in turn transcends judgment. Thus the processes by which judgment performs its function are also the source of its imperfection. Because it is selective, because it must work with terms and relations, thinking can never fail to fall short of perfect unity in difference. "Judgement has to qualify the Real ideally. And the word 'idea' means that the original unity has so far been broken. This is the fundamental inconsistency of judgement which remains to the end unremoved, and which in principle vitiates more or less all ideas and truth. For ideas cannot qualify reality as reality is qualified immediately in feeling, and yet judgement seeks in vain to escape from this foregone method" (p. 231; cf. pp. 330 f.).

Hence the problem of consistency and contradiction takes on the peculiar form which that problem has in Mr. Bradley's system. The judgment always asserts the simple identification of subject and predicate. Ultimately the subject of the judgment is reality, and hence what is really asserted is the identity of reality with the ideal content by which the judgment qualifies reality. But no ideal content can ever be identical with reality, for reality is a unity in difference which in principle excludes the relational form of an ideal content. In consequence every judgment must contradict itself, and the detection of this contradiction at once lays upon judgment the necessity of seeking the conditions which would enable it to identify subject and predicate. In short, it must seek the totality of conditions that would make its ideal content identical with reality, and this is a goal which could be reached only after the judgment form had been left behind. "Truth is not perfect so long as it fails anywhere to include its reality, and its reality is not whole so long as any of its conditions are left out. Truth, compelled to select, is therefore forced to remain forever defective. Its purpose, though realized increasingly, is not utterly fulfilled, and to fulfil that purpose would be to pass beyond the proper sphere and limits of truth" (p. 330). On its part, the judgment, because of its defect, constantly threatens to lapse into the form of abstract identification; but this form is meaningless and thus

shows itself at once to be what the judgment never really means (p. 231 f.). The judgment is always fated to mean more than it can really say and to say more than it has any right to mean.

The theory of judgment here outlined forms, if I have understood him, the foundation of Mr. Bradley's philosophy. It is restated in the present volume with perhaps increasing vigor and clearness, but it has long been familiar to readers of the *Principles of Logic* and *Appearance and Reality*. The peculiarity of the position lies not in any single element of the theory, for all these could be duplicated elsewhere without difficulty, but in the combination of the elements. There is, of course, nothing peculiar in Mr. Bradley's theory of the abstractness of judgment; this is perhaps commonly accepted, at least outside of Hegelianism. Nor is the theory unknown that a fully mediated judgment would be identical with reality; this is common to most philosophy depending upon Hegel. But the combination of these two views is peculiar, so far as I know, to Mr. Bradley. Professor Bosanquet, perhaps, would agree with him (cf. *Logic*, 2d ed., Vol. II, p. 288, note b), but certainly he has nowhere emphasized immediate experience and the inadequacy of judgment as Mr. Bradley has done repeatedly. The essence of Mr. Bradley's position is his ideal identification of thought and reality, witnessed by the inherent striving of the judgment toward a totality of conditions, while at the same time he insists that thought, because it is abstract and selective, can never be identical with reality.

On its face this position is singular enough to merit some explanation and Mr. Bradley has supplied the clue at least to its origin. As was said above, Mr. Bradley, in common with other idealists, starts from the dualism of Kant, and this requires, it is held, some sort of identification of thought and reality. Now by all odds the most thorough-going attempt to carry out this identification by the post-Kantians is to be found in Hegel's dialectic. But as Mr. Bradley tells us, the dialectic, if it ever gained his acceptance, certainly lost it before he got his own point of view finally formulated. The development of the whole reality from every partial element by compensating the internal contradictions of the part is not a verifiable solution of the problem of unity in difference (pp. 223 f.). The difficulty here, or at least one difficulty, if I understand Mr. Bradley, is that the dialectic implies a literal identification of thought and reality, a construction of reality from the terms and relations of thought, and this, as he tells us elsewhere (*Appearance*, Appendix, p. 554), he never could adopt. The principle of the dialectic would satisfy the

intellect if it were verifiable, but since it is not, the intellect is unable to satisfy its own demands and must look for their satisfaction in a whole which is above intellect. Abstract identity is untenable because it is meaningless, and yet the intellect does not possess the principle of identity in diversity which alone would suffice for its satisfaction (*Appearance*, Appendix, p. 568 f.).

Mr. Bradley's position, then, is the outcome of a characteristically subtle reformulation of the principle of dialectic. The principle is accepted and rejected at once. It is accepted in so far as Mr. Bradley regards thought as a pursuit of consistency which cannot stop short of the inclusion of an absolute totality of conditions; this clearly suggests Hegel's ideal of a self-differentiating, concrete thought. The principle is rejected, however, in that this movement of thought is not really the 'rational self-development of the Absolute' itself; it is the manipulation of terms in relations, of abstractions which can never themselves reach the goal of perfect unity in diversity. The case seems to stand as follows: Hegel's ideal is ultimately intelligible but it is impossible because thought is not what Hegel takes it to be; nevertheless, as intelligible, this ideal is necessary and therefore ultimately real.

The important critical question, of course, is whether Mr. Bradley's partial acceptance and partial rejection of Hegelian principles can be made tenable. The question is difficult and needs a long and careful discussion which is impossible here. If I may be allowed merely to indicate what I conceive to be its consequences, I would say that it appears to me to involve Mr. Bradley's account of the criterion of truth in a hopeless ambiguity. The criterion, of course, is said to be non-contradiction. It is clear that this criterion applies to truth considered strictly, for the principle of contradiction can apply only to terms. It has no application except in the judgment; Mr. Bradley defines contradiction as the "simple identification of the diverse" (p. 228). On the other hand, however, the function of the judgment is to seek a higher immediacy. In the long run every judgment is contradictory and the coherence which judgment mediates must always be the concrete unity in difference of immediate experience. But surely Mr. Bradley cannot hold that this concrete harmony and coherence is identical with the non-contradiction of judgments. The judgment cannot attain the coherence of immediacy without ceasing to be judgment; but certainly nothing can be contradicted except a judgment and nothing can contradict a judgment except another judgment. The test of truth, then, might conceivably be the concrete

harmony which it produces, or it might be the absence of self-contradiction, but it is difficult to see how it can be both at once. The ambiguity, it should be noted, is produced by Mr. Bradley's combination of Hegelian and non-Hegelian points of view. The essence of the Hegelian position was that contradiction is a force at work in things; there is no difference between contradicting judgments and incoherent things. It is possible, moreover, to see the direction in which the ambiguity in Mr. Bradley's criterion of truth will lead him. The judgment by itself, as he notes, has a tendency to lapse into abstract identity, because it asserts an identity and lacks the ground for true unity in difference. So long as the emphasis is on contradiction, therefore, the tendency will be to find mere difference contradictory and to identify non-contradiction with abstract identity. On the other hand, when the emphasis falls on concrete coherence, one would expect to find the latter ready to swallow even apparent contradictions. I believe that it could be shown in detail that something of this sort really happens in the *Appearance and Reality*; certainly the earlier, critical portions of that work seem to use the principle of contradiction in a way quite different from the later, constructive portions.

Mr. Bradley feels it necessary to apologize for the number of pages devoted to pragmatism in the present volume (p. vi). But surely it is easy to see, supposing the preceding criticism of Mr. Bradley's criterion of truth to be at all sound, why Mr. Bradley has been the target of so much pragmatist criticism. The dialectical development of an ideal content to a point of identity with reality seems quite meaningless unless thought really constitutes reality. The pragmatist rejected any such assumption, and here Mr. Bradley gave him aid and support; for no idealist has been so outspoken in rejecting an identity between thought and reality. To the pragmatist, therefore, there was in Mr. Bradley's idealism just one confusion the less to be combatted. And what more natural than that the pragmatist should try to show that if one rejected Hegel, the rejection must at least be whole-hearted? If one really believes that thought does not constitute reality, it is surely not plausible to believe that thought must eternally and vainly endeavor to do so. Mr. Bradley had himself argued cogently that the function of thought is to heal disharmonies in immediate experience, that the judgment arises as a process of mediation in response to the demand for such harmony, and that it fulfils its function when it issues in immediacy at a higher level. Remove from Mr. Bradley's philosophy the dialectical remnant which makes

him depreciate judgment because subject and predicate never can be identical, and thereby remove the presumption that immediate experience must be absolute, and surely the way to pragmatism is open. The disharmonies become specific occasions and thought must be judged by its functioning in a definite situation. Whether one calls the disharmony practical or not is a minor matter; it may be called so in the sense that as a disharmony it is not explicitly a contradiction. Without exaggeration it may be said that Mr. Bradley's formulation of idealism was the natural point of attack for the pragmatists.

All students of philosophy will be delighted to see that Mr. Bradley holds out in his Preface the hope that his earlier works are now to be republished. It will be the sincere wish of everyone that this may be done. The *Ethical Studies* and the *Principles of Logic* have long been out of print and are difficult to obtain in the original editions. The photographic reprints in which most scholars are forced to use these works are so badly made as to be wholly unworthy of them. The two volumes in question are classics in the history of English Idealism, the *Ethical Studies* being earlier in date than any other work of present interest produced by that movement. Mr. Bradley will confer a benefit of no small consequence upon his younger contemporaries by making these works accessible to them. It is to be hoped also that the original text will be preserved intact. The books already have an historical value and are likely to have a greater. It would be unfortunate to obscure their value in this respect by the introduction of minor revisions.

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Law as a Means to an End. By RUDOLF VON JHERING. Translated by ISAAC HUSIK. Boston, Boston Book Co., 1913.—pp. lix, 483.

This translation of the first volume of Jhering's *Zweck im Recht* forms the fifth volume of the Modern Legal Philosophy Series. The object of this series, published under the auspices of the Association of American Law Schools, is to make the best modern works in legal philosophy available to the English speaking lawyer. That such a task should be undertaken by such a representative body is significant not only of the breakdown of the insularity or provincialism which has long kept common law jurists as a rule entirely unacquainted with the juristic thought of other countries, but also significant of the liberation from the still prevailing ideaphobia which is gradually taking place nowadays in the forefront of many fields of intellectual